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ABSTRACT
Increasing numbers of foreign firms are holding cross-border IPOs in attempts to raise
capital in markets outside of their home nation. Within the United States cross-border
IPOs consistently experience greater amounts of underpricing than domestic IPOs. This
paper examines the effects of SIC industry classifications on cross-border and domestic
IPO underpricing from 2004-2010. Analysis demonstrates that in various industries, SIC
classification has a significant impact upon underpricing in comparison to other
industries. While in other industries, significance is solely exhibited through the differing
impacts of domestic and cross-border IPOs, within the industry itself, upon underpricing.
The most significant industry effect is seen in high-technology industries which display a
significant impact on underpricing on both the inter-industry and intra-industry level.
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I. Introduction
Within the last two decades, international investment opportunities have
flourished as an increasing number of countries eliminate or ease restrictive legal barriers
for foreign investment. Simultaneously, an increasingly large number of firms have
looked outside the borders of their home countries in search of new opportunities to raise
capital. This investment is primarily done through initial public offerings (IPOs) held in
foreign markets, also known as cross-border IPOs. As cross-border IPOs become more
common, severe underpricing of these international IPOs almost always occurs.
Researchers and economists have examined this trend and the rationale behind such an
occurrence. Many previous studies examined intra-industry effects but no previous
studies have expounded on the impact of SIC industry classification, and thus the
overarching industry characteristics, upon IPO underpricing (Akhigbe, et al., 2003).
This study examines international firms holding an initial public offering on a US
exchange, defining initial public offering to mean that the firm is not listed on any other
exchange at the time of the cross-border IPO. IPO underpricing will be measured as the
percentage difference between the company’s offer price and the price at the end of the
first trading day. In addition, the following control variables will be analyzed in attempts
to control for possible investor exposure to a individual firm’s IPO rather than exposure
to an industry as a whole: size of the initial public offering, overhang percentage, number
of days since the last domestic IPO within the industry, how many of the top five firms
within the industry (as determined by net sales) are based in the US, number of
employees within the firm, and net sales of the individual firms.
1

This paper will proceed as follows: Section II is a review of the academic
literature on IPO underpricing and the theories being applied to cross-border IPO
underpricing. Section III describes the data and data collection process. Section IV
illustrates the methods used to analyze the data. Section V provides and discusses the
results of the econometric analysis. Section VI concludes the paper and presents areas for
potential future studies.

II. Literature Review
The concept of IPO underpricing has been thoroughly examined with the primary
theories of IPO underpricing grouped under four broad categories: asymmetric
information, institutional, signaling, and behavioral. The significant difference in foreign
and domestic IPO underpricing has led scholars to begin applying the traditional
explanations for domestic IPO underpricing to cross-border IPOs. In a study examining
foreign and domestic IPOs between 1990-1993, Francis, Hasan, and Li (2001) found that
foreign IPOs experienced underpricing of 13.79% compared to underpricing of 8.75%
experienced by domestic IPOs. The IPOs were matched based upon SIC Code and
issuing year. The disparity between foreign and domestic IPO underpricing has fluctuated
throughout the years, but a notable difference still exists between the two today.
Information asymmetry is often pointed to as the source behind much of the
cross-border IPO underpricing trend. This theory assumes that one of the parties involved
in an IPO transaction, the issuing firm, the underwriting bank, or the potential investors,
2

knows more than the other parties. However, while various studies have examined
differing cultural, financial, and geographical factors impacting both IPO underpricing
and IPO aftermarket performance, very little has been done to categorize this information
asymmetry on an industry-wide basis. (Grinnblatt and Kloharju, 2001; Bruner et al.,
2000; Ejara and Ghosh, 2004). The focus of these previous studies has been to
distinguish specific variables affecting the discrepancy in underpricing between domestic
IPOs and foreign IPOs. A study performed by Grinnblatt and Keloharju (2001) on
Finnish investors shows that stocks originating from countries with geographical
proximity to, a common language with, or a shared border with Finland performed better.
As most of these studies have concentrated on country-specific or firm-specific variables,
my study will contribute to the recent upsurge in literature by examining industry-wide
variables which may be affecting cross border IPO underpricing.
IPO underpricing can stem from investors having a different set of information or
from the IPO management team having a different set of information. Hurusti and Maula
(2007) displayed that pre-ownership and management by foreign investors has a
significant impact of the underpricing of a cross-border IPO. Firms with pre-IPO
ownership by foreign investors or whose management teams had previous experience
with international IPOs displayed less underpricing due to increased international
experience and exposure. Thus, familiarity on both sides of the IPO equation diminishes
the amount of underpricing experienced during a cross-border IPO.
Institutional factors can also have a significant impact on the quantity of crossborder IPOs occurring within a given country as well as the performance of those cross3

border IPOs with regards to underpricing. Moore, Bell, and Filatotchev’s (2010) study
demonstrates the importance of investor protection in country of origin and exchange
listing requirements in the destination country on IPO underpricing in both the United
States and the United Kingdom. A greater level of investor protection as defined by the
La Porta’s index, which classifies the level of investor protection through the
enforcement of regulations and laws, diminishes underpricing. In addition, IPOs
occurring on exchanges in the United States with stricter listing requirements showed less
underpricing than IPOs occurring on similar exchanges in the United Kingdom. These
types of bureaucratic variables can have a significant impact on underpricing of domestic
and cross-border IPOs before investor familiarity even becomes a factor.
Another explanation of IPO underpricing is the information signaling hypothesis.
Ritter (1991) argues that firms may choose to go public when investors are “irrationally
over-optimistic” about the future of certain industries. The subsequent dramatic increase
in share price during the IPO would promote a favorable signal for not only the company
itself but also for the industry as a whole. Ritter’s research has been further expanded in
a study by Francis, et al. (2010) to include evidence from foreign IPOs in attempts to
examine why companies are willing to leave substantial amounts of money on the table in
order to signal high investor expectations. Francis, et al. discovered that signaling theory
is primarily important for cross-border IPOs relating to the underpricing of companies
originating in segmented financial markets. Firms from segmented financial markets face
higher information asymmetry and thus have a greater need to access external capital
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markets. The trend among these firms is to issue large amounts of seasoned equity shortly
after their initial public offering; therefore, they are willing to leave money on the table in
order to signal high investor expectations to the market so that their seasoned equity
offerings become a more profitable endeavor.
Regardless of a firms’ potential signaling, it is proven that investor behavior,
whether rational or irrational, is one of the most significant factors affecting cross-border
IPO underpricing. Investors generally do not invest heavily in foreign entities, including
cross-border IPOs. Most existing studies reveal that investors primarily invest in local
markets due to unfamiliarity with foreign assets, also known as home bias. Kang and
Stulz (1997) suggest that home bias leads Japanese investors who do chose to invest in
foreign entities to be highly selective in which industries and firms they choose to invest
in, rather than selecting a broad market portfolio of investments. In particular, investors
over allocate portfolio space to manufacturing industries, large firms, and firms with low
leverage and low unsystematic risk. These were industries and qualities that were either
familiar to the sample of investors as demonstrated by the prominent industries within
Japan, or had been proven to be correlated with high stock performance on the domestic
market.
While it is difficult to identify what exact qualities contribute to familiarity, it is
known that individual investors will choose to invest in organizations, industries, and
firm qualities that they have increased exposure to or are familiar with. Huberman (2001)
proved that shareholders of regional bell operating companies tend to live in the area
served by the company. Even though other regional bell operating companies were
5

performing better investors continued to demonstrate a geographic bias due to their
familiarity with the company in their region. Likewise, Massa and Simonov (2006)
demonstrated that Swedish investors selected stocks closely related with their personal
non-financial income. Individuals were using their geographic and professional
affiliations as a no cost, efficient source of information regarding investments. These
familiarity-based investments were allowing the investors to achieve higher returns than
they otherwise would have if they attempted to diversify or hedge their investments
through independent information sources.
Akhigbe et al. (2003) examined the effects of an IPO upon rival firms within an
industry, but their results were largely inconclusive. They found that the lack of intraindustry reaction was due to the offsetting influences of information effects and
competitive effects. Although their results determined the intra-industry effect to be
insignificant, their examination of the variables composing what they deemed
“informational effects” and “competitive effects” proved that certain factors influencing
an industry as a whole can have an impact upon the cumulative average returns of firms
within that industry. Significant informational effects including industry regulation and
length of time between industry IPOs produced a positive reaction upon rival firms
within industries, but their impact was negated by negative competitive effects such as
large IPOs in competitive industries or classification as a high-technology industry. Their
research posed the question of whether these industry effects may impact IPO
underpricing of firms within a specific industry.

6

There is existing research distinguishing cross-border IPO underpricing and
domestic IPO underpricing, but the research on testable explanations for the underpricing
is limited because the number of cross-border IPOs was minimal until the early-1990s.
Very few of the studies examining this phenomenon incorporate industry classifications
and almost none of the studies conduct industry-wide analysis. Identifying patterns in
industry underpricing between foreign and domestic IPOs may provide an arbitrage
opportunity for investors to take advantage of the discrepancy in IPO underpricing within
particular industries. This paper examines how industry-wide characteristics influence
the underpricing of cross-border IPOs as opposed to domestic IPOs.

III. Data Collection and Description
This study includes all cross-border IPOs occurring in the United States from
2004-2010, as well as domestic IPOs from comparable US-based companies. Within the
context of this study, “comparable” is being defined as identically matching SIC codes
within the designated time frame. The IPOs included within this study, both cross-border
and domestic, were identified through the Hoovers database as having occurred between
2004-2010 and include listings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq Exchange. All data pertaining to stock pricings,
company information, and IPO specifics were acquired through the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) while all information relating to industry statistics or data is
from Hoovers.

7

The data set includes the initial offer price of the IPO and the share price at
closing on the first day of trading. From this data I calculated the underpricing percent
which will act as the dependent variable for all my regressions. I also calculated the
overhang percent as the number of shares issued in the IPO as a percent of total shares
outstanding on the date of issuance. In addition, all American depository receipts (ADRs)
were eliminated from the data. ADRs enable investors to purchase shares of a foreign
company through a depository bank rather than allowing investors direct trading access
through a stock exchange. Since many companies issuing ADRs are already listed on an
exchange in their home country, they were eliminated from the sample. Penny stocks
(IPOs with an issue price of under five dollars) and companies who have gone bankrupt
or been privatized since their issue date were also eliminated from the study due to the
lack of available data. In addition, any cross-border IPOs without a domestic IPO within
the same SIC code were eliminated from the sample set of data.
I also chose to eliminate SIC codes in which the only cross-border IPOs were
from companies listing Bermuda, the Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands as their country of
origin. Most of these firms have incorporated to these locales for tax purposes alone and
are often domestic firms simply using these foreign locales as their IPO country of origin.
They are therefore not representative of typical cross-border IPOs and may skew the final
results. However, the SIC codes in which the sample of cross-border IPOs included IPOs
originating in Bermuda, the Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands in addition to cross-border
IPOs from other foreign locales were left in the sample data. As long as other
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international firms are also conducting IPOs within a particular industry I cannot assume
that the firms listing Bermuda, the Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands as their country of
origin are representing firms incorporating for tax purposes alone but may instead be
actual firms originating from and operating within the designated country. This is in
agreement with many previous studies which have also eliminated these issues for the
aforementioned reasons (Moore et al., 2010). After all the data had been cleaned, I was
left with a sample of 93 cross-border IPOs and 219 domestic IPOs spanning 42 different
industries. It should however be noted that a potential flaw in my data set is that I
composed it manually so there is the possibility of human error.

IV. Methodology
We use the following empirical model to analyze the data and explain the effect
of the following variables on IPO underpricing. The variables of primary interest are SIC
and SIC*Foreign as the intent of this study is to examine the effect of SIC classification
upon underpricing; all other variables are utilized as control variables.
UNDERP = β0 + β1OVERH + β2SALES + β3EMP + β4OFFERA +

(1)

β5TOP +β6DAYS + β7DATE + β8US + β9SIC + β10SIC*US + ε
where:
UNDERPRICING = the underpricing of a firm’s IPO as measured by the
difference between the offer price and the trading price at the end of the
first day
OVERHANG = the amount of overhang resulting from the IPO, measured as the
9

number of shares offered in the IPO as a percent of the firm’s total shares
outstanding at the time the IPO registration was filed with the securities
and exchange commission
SALES = the dollar amount in millions of net sales recorded for the most recent
year prior to the IPO
EMPLOYEES = the number of employees
OFFER AMOUNT = the size of the IPO in millions of dollars
TOP 5 US = the number of US based firms within the industry’s top five
companies as measured by sales in millions of dollars
DAYS = the number of days since the most recent US IPO within the industry
DATE = the date of the IPO
FOREIGN = 1 if the IPO firm has filed with an international location as their
country of origin, 0 if the firm filed with the US as their country of origin.
This variable is not included in the regression itself to avoid
multicollinearity in the results due to its presence in the interaction term
SIC*FOREIGN
SIC = the four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code assigned to the
firm followed by four zeros, representing the industry effect of all broad
characteristics applying to all firms within the industry as a whole. This is
a categorical variable with a level for each individual industry dummy
variable
SIC*FOREIGN = an interaction term calculated by multiplying the foreign
variable by the SIC Variable
10

V. Results and Analysis
Table III provides a correlation matrix for the regression variables while Table IV
provides the summary statistics and correlation analysis for the 312 observations included
in the model. The correlations between variables seem to be generally low, suggesting
that multicollinearity should not be a significant problem in my regressions.
The results from my regression are displayed in Table VII and show that most
control variables are not statistically significant. Out of the control variables, only days
since last domestic IPO is significant on the ten percent level and displays a negative
relationship with IPO underpricing. This relationship signifies that as the number of days
since the last domestic IPO within the industry increases, the underpricing of the IPO will
decrease by 0.00002 percent. This may be explained by the fact that when a domestic
IPO has not occurred within a particular industry for a significant period of time,
investors do more research prior to the IPO due to their lack of recent familiarity with
IPOs in that industry. When investors are more informed, some of the information
asymmetry between the underwriters and investors is eliminated and thus the IPO is less
likely to demonstrate underpricing.
Using the above model, I calculated the impact of the given variables upon IPO
underpricing and find that nine out of 42 industries within the variable SIC have an
impact upon IPO underpricing which is statistically different from all other industries at
the five percent level: Miscellaneous publishing, Commercial printing, Chemical
preparations, Computer peripheral equipment, Wireline telecommunications equipment,
Telecommunications equipment, Opthalmic goods, Sporting and athletic goods, and
11

Water utilities. Eight of the nine industries have a positive relationship with underpricing,
meaning that the particular industry has greater underpricing than the underpricing
experienced by all other industries. In contrast, Chemical preparations is the only
industry with a negative relationship with underpricing. The coefficient for this industry
is -0.1523634 signifying that the IPOs within the chemical preparations industry are, on
average, 15.24 percent less underpriced than IPOs in all other industries. However, six
out of the nine industries only contain sample data from one cross-border IPO and one or
two corresponding domestic IPOs meaning that the results may not be entirely
representative of IPOs within the industries. The other three industries, Computer
peripheral equipment, Wireline telecommunications equipment, and Telecommunications
equipment, all have more than four observations in their respective samples so their
results may be more representatively consistent.
My primary examination will be of the interaction variable SIC*Foreign. I find
that for 16 out of the 42 industries within this variable, cross-border IPOs and domestic
IPOs have statistically different underpricing. This variable interacts each individual SIC
code with the binary variable, foreign, to demonstrate the relationship of IPO
underpricing to both cross-border and domestic IPOs within a given industry. The results
of my regression denote 16 occurrences, categorized by SIC code, as statistically
significant. These occurrences signify that within a particular SIC code, cross-border and
domestic IPOs have significantly different impacts on underpricing. Among the
significant occurrences, ten have positive coefficients and six have negative coefficients.
12

A positive coefficient signifies that underpricing for a foreign IPO in that industry is, on
average, greater than the underpricing for a domestic IPO in that industry. In contrast, a
negative coefficient means that a foreign IPO within that industry will have the less
underpricing than a domestic IPO within the industry. The difference in underpricing will
be quantified by the numerical amount of the coefficient.
The positive relationship with underpricing demonstrated by ten of the SIC codes
is consistent with prior literature regarding foreign IPOs displaying greater underpricing
than their domestic counterparts. There is no discernable pattern or grouping to be made
among the significant SIC codes as the industries range from information retrieval
services to plastic materials and resins. Within this sample of positive relationships, it is
also worth noting that the number of observations per SIC varies greatly with a minimum
of two and a maximum of eight. There are four SIC codes with only two observations,
meaning that only one cross-border IPO and one domestic IPO occurred within that
industry during the designated time period of 2004-2010. SIC codes with only two or
three observations in the sample data are likely to be a bit biased due to the isolated
nature of the data and will not necessarily be an accurate portrayal of the relationship
between IPO underpricing and cross-border IPOs.
The negative relationship with underpricing demonstrated by six of the SIC codes
is contrary to general statistics regarding cross-border IPO underpricing. However three
of the six industries are generally defined as high-tech industries within the broader
computer and telecommunications industries, based upon total R&D as a percent of sales,
which may explain the negative relationship. Historically the most well known and
13

successful high-tech computer and telecommunications production and development has
been concentrated in Asia or other foreign locales. In addition, technology related firms
are more likely to have alliance, business partners, or foreign stake-holders outside of
their country of origin. These general trends may cause a reverse home bias with regards
to cross-border IPOs in high-tech industries in which the foreign companies exhibit less
underpricing than the domestic ones due to investor’s high performance expectations for
or familiarity with foreign technology related companies.
The other three SIC codes which have a negative relationship with underpricing
cannot be classified as technology related industries but may instead simply be unreliable
results. All three industries only have two observations, a cross-border IPO and a
corresponding domestic IPO within the same industry. As previously stated, this lack of
observations in my sample may mean that the significance of the results may not be
representing an accurate depiction of the normal relationship between a particular
industry’s domestic and foreign IPOs and underpricing.
Overall, the most significant impact on underpricing will be exhibited by the
industries in which both the SIC variable and the SIC*Foreign variable prove to be
statistically significant. In the case that both variables show significance, then the
industry as a whole has significantly different underpricing than average underpricing
experienced by all other industries and within the industry itself there is a significant
difference between domestic and cross-border IPO underpricing. In the case that the SIC
variable is significant but the SIC*Foreign variable is not, it suggests that the average
industry underpricing is significantly different from all the average underpricing of all
14

other industries, but within the industry itself the difference between domestic and crossborder IPO underpricing is not statistically significant. The reverse is true in the case that
the SIC*Foreign variable is significant but the SIC variable is not. Examination of the
results from my primary regression in Table VII yields seven industries with significant
SIC and SIC*Foreign variables. However, since this analysis is comparing a
compounding effect across two variables, I ran a second regression using only SIC codes
with 4 or more observations to ensure more robust results.
The second regression demonstrates that three out of 21 industries have
significant results in both the SIC and SIC*Foreign variables: Computer peripheral
equipment, Wireline telecommunications equipment, and Telecommunications
equipment. Table V compares the results from my base regression (1) and this additional
regression (2) which sets a minimum on observations per SIC code. All three of the
industries have positive relationships on the industry level but negative relationships on
the foreign/domestic level. This signifies that all three industries display greater
underpricing compared to the average underpricing of all other industries, yet within the
industry itself the foreign IPOs experience less underpricing than the domestic IPOs. All
three of these industries are also classified as high-technology related industries implying
that they are industries with high potential for growth and high risk to reward metrics.
The high growth potential often means that investors have high expectations for the
performance of this stock. The high level of investor expectations may increase IPO
underpricing by artificially inflating the stock price during the first day of trading.
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Therefore, it is not unusual to expect these industries to demonstrate greater underpricing
than the average underpricing of all other industries.

Robustness Testing
The events of the financial crisis from late 2007 to early 2009 caused a drastic
decline in the number of domestic and cross-border IPOs occurring in the United States
as seen in Table II. In addition IPO underpricing and average first day returns during
2008 were significantly lower than the years ex-ante and ex-post financial crisis. Due to
this shock in underpricing, I test the robustness of my results by performing a third
regression in which IPOs occurring from August 2007-January 2009 are eliminated from
the sample data. The deletion of these IPOs resulted in certain industries being omitted
from the sample data because the only foreign or domestic IPO for a given industry
occurred within the time period surrounding the financial crisis. Also, the control
variables DATE (IPO date) and DAYS (Days since last domestic IPO within the
industry) were dropped from the regression because of the break in chronological data.
UNDERP = β0 + β1OVERH + β2SALES + β3EMP + β4OFFERA +

(3)

β5TOP + β7US + β8SIC + β9SIC*US + ε
Table VI presents the results of this regression compared to the results of our
initial regression. The elimination of financial crisis data resulted in the control variable
OFFER AMOUNT becoming significant at the ten percent level and the industry Process
control instruments within the variable SIC*Foreign becoming significant at the five
percent level. Certain variables and industries, such as the control variable DAYS, were
16

removed from the regression (3) data set and thus could no longer test for significance.
However, other than the variables which were removed from the regression all industries
within the SIC*Foreign variable continued to be statistically significant once the data
relating to the financial crisis was removed from the sample set. The continuity among
the data between the two regressions suggests that my initial results are fairly robust and
the financial crisis did not significantly skew the significance of my results.

VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of SIC industry classifications on cross-border
and domestic IPO underpricing from 2004-2010. Using control and interaction variables,
I performed econometric analysis to determine which industries had a significant impact
upon IPO underpricing. This paper finds that various industries, as classified by fourdigit SIC codes, have a significant impact on the underpricing of initial public offerings
for both domestic and foreign firms within the given industry. In addition, the number of
days since the last domestic IPO in a given industry has a negative impact upon IPO
underpricing. This indicates that IPOs occurring shortly after a domestic IPO within the
same industry are more likely to have significant underpricing than those after a period of
dormancy.
While many industries have a significant impact at either the cross industry level
or the intra-industry level between domestic and cross-border IPOs, only a few show
continuous significance within both areas. Most predominantly, investment in the high-
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technology industries of computer peripheral equipment, Wireline telecommunications
equipment, and Telecommunications equipment may yield the most profitable results.
These industries demonstrate the most significant results on both the cross-industry and
intra-industry level. While the exact difference cannot be quantified these industries
exhibit greater underpricing on average than all other industries meaning that their end of
first day trading price is much greater than their initial offer price. In addition, domestic
IPOs display greater underpricing than the cross-border IPOs within these industries. An
arbitrage opportunity may exist if investors chose to invest at the initial offer price of
domestic IPOs within these high-technology industries.
This paper also opens several other areas for potential study. Obtaining a data set
spanning a greater period of time may be advisable in order to provide a more
comprehensive study of industry. Due to the rarity of IPOs being issued in certain
industries, many industries were excluded from my study because only a domestic or a
cross-border IPO occurred within the industry during my defined time period while one
of each was required for inclusion in the sample data. It would also be interesting to
expand my research to other international markets in order to see if the same conclusions
are held when US firms are no longer the domestic IPOs but instead constitute a portion
of the cross-border IPOs.
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Appendix
Table I: SIC Codes Included in Data Set & Number of IPOs Observed per SIC Code
SIC Code
13820000

Samples
3

20850000

2

27410000

3

27590000

2

28210000

3

28340000

44

28360000

15

28990000
35590000

2
4

35770000

5

36610000

5

36630000

4

36740000

34

38230000

2

38410000

12

38450000

13

38510000
39490000

2
2

44120000

21

45120000

4

47240000

2

SIC Industry Name
Oil & gas exploration
Services
Distillers and blended
liquors

SIC Code
48120000

Samples
3

48130000

6

Miscellaneous
publishing
Commercial printing

48330000

2

48990000

7

Plastics materials and
resins
Pharmaceutical
preparations
Biological products,
except diagnostic
Chemical preparations
Special industry
machinery
Computer peripheral
equipment
Wireline
telecommunications
equipment
Telecommunications
equipment
Semiconductors and
related devices
Process control
instruments
Surgical and medical
instruments
Electromedical
equipment

49410000

2

51710000

3

55410000

2

55990000
58120000

2
9

59120000

2

64110000

3

65310000

5

67260000

5

Real estate agents
and managers
Investment offices

70110000

3

Hotels and motels

73120000

2

73710000

9

Opthalmic goods
Sporting and athletic
goods
Deep sea foreign
transportation of freight
Air transportation,
scheduled
Travel agencies

73720000
73750000

38
8

73890000

11

Outdoor advertising
services
Custom computer
programming
services
Prepackaged software
Information retrieval
services
Business services

82990000

4

89990000

2

21

SIC Industry Name
Radiotelephone
communication
Telephone
communication,
except radio
Television
broadcasting stations
Communication
services
Water utilities
Petroleum bulk
stations and terminals
Gasoline service
stations
Automotive dealers
Eating places
Drug stores and
proprietary stores
Insurance agents,
brokers, and service

Schools and
educational services
Services

Table II. Market Share of Foreign Companies among US Listing, 2004-2010
Year

Number of IPOs Domestic Foreign % Foreign

2004

39

33

6

15.38%

2005

41

31

10

24.39%

2006

62

44

18

29.03%

2007

76

53

23

30.26%

2008

8

6

2

25.00%

2009

25

19

6

24.00%

2010

61

33

28

45.90%

Table III: Correlation Matrix for base regression (1)
OFFERA
OFFERA
1.0000
SALES
0.5873
EMP
0.4631
OVERH
0.0658
TOP
-0.0998
DAYS
0.0988
DATE
0.0597
FOREIGN
0.0844
SIC
0.1741

SALES

EMP

1.0000
0.5182 1.0000
-0.1006 -0.0449
-0.1018 -0.0746
0.1018 0.1611
-0.0948 0.0336
-0.0035 0.1456
0.1315 0.2399

OVERH

TOP

DAYS

1.0000
-0.0560 1.0000
0.0286 -0.0769 1.0000
0.2609 0.0913 -0.0157
0.3048 -0.2024 0.1339
0.1696 0.3624 0.1341

DATE FOREIGN

1.0000
0.1820
0.1513

SIC

1.0000
0.0850 1.0000

Table IV: Summary Statistics of base regression (1)
Variable
Underpricing %
Offer Amount
Sales
Employees
SIC Code
Overhang %
Top 5 in
Industry US
based?
Days since last
industry IPO
Date of IPO
Foreign

Observations
312
312
312
312
312
312
312

Mean
.1117277
165.1917
530.678
2261.429
4.78e+07
.3374193
1.512821

Standard Dev.
.1982499
229.3064
1865.807
5461.585
1.81e+07
.2283975
1.341819

Min
-.2954545
4.5
0
3
1.38e+07
.0132179
0

Max
1
1875.5
29321
45000
9.00e+07
1
4

312

617.0609

1329.838

0

18940

312
312

17351.65
.2980769

728.4094
.4581483

16071
0

18613
1
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Table V: Comparative Descriptive Statistics of Significant Results
(2)
Minimum 4 observations Per SIC Code

(1)
SIC
0.2035**
(0.10193)
27590000 0.1278**
(0.12780)

SIC*Foreign

27410000

27590000 1
28210000 1

28990000
35770000
36610000
36630000
38510000
39490000

-0.1523**
(0.07404)
0.3084***
(0.11579)
0.2143**
(0.10346)
0.2697***
(0.07124)
0.1462**
(0.07316)
0.3337***
(0.06704)

35770000 1
36610000 1
36630000 1
38510000 1
39490000 1
47240000 1
48330000 1
48990000 1

49410000

0.4517*** 49410000 1
(0.06796)
51710000 1
55410000 1
64110000 1
70110000 1
73750000 1

0.0955***
(0.015181)
0.2670***
(0.050187)

-0.3341***
(0.127171)
-0.4042***
(0.082064)
-0.4026***
(0.022021)
-0.0605**
(0.026025)
0.1391***
(0.023193)
0.9436***
(0.046182)
0.2484***
(0.040432)
0.1871**
(0.075458)
-0.4634***
(0.074203)
0.1210*
(0.066738)
-0.3043*
(0.168932)
0.5876***
(0.048869)
0.2081*
(0.118975)
0.6575***
(0.125901)

SIC
SIC*Foreign
35590000 0.2396***
(0.0564)
35770000 0.3765*** 35770000 1 -0.3443***
(0.09414)
(0.121149)
36610000 0.2882*** 36610000 1 -0.4004***
(0.08129)
(0.076982)
36630000 0.3350*** 36630000 1 -0.4066***
(0.03398)
(0.022978)
36740000 0.1432***
(0.05537)
38410000 0.1694*
(0.09379)
48990000 1 0.1845**
(0.079248)
58120000 1 0.2496*
(0.144179)
73720000 0.0964**
(0.04661)
73750000 1 0.6395***
(0.122584)
82990000 0.1816***
(0.04505)

Days

Observations

-0.00002**
(0.00002)
0.29431
(0.31313)
249

R2

0.2611

Constant

Days

-0.00002*
(9.05e-06)
Constant
0.25584
(0.34771)
Observations 312
R2

0.3506

*** denotes 1% confidence, ** denotes 5% confidence, * denotes 10% confidence
Note: Only results for variables with statistical significance are included in this table
although the regression contained other continuous variables and SIC codes.
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Table VI: Comparative Descriptive Statistics of Significant Results
Variable
Offer Amount
Days
SIC* Foreign
27590000 1
28210000 1
35770000 1
36610000 1
36630000 1
38230000 1
38510000 1
39490000 1
47240000 1
48330000 1
48990000 1
49410000 1
51710000 1
55410000 1
64110000 1
70110000 1
73750000 1

Constant

(1)
0.000103
(0.000088)
-0.000016*
(9.05e-06)

(3)
Without Financial Crisis Data
0.000101*
(0.000061)
--

0.09551***
(0.015181)
0.26703***
(0.050187)
-0.33417***
(0.127171)
-0.40423***
(0.082064)
-0.40262***
(0.022021)
-0.10844
(0.071492)
-0.06052**
(0.026025)
0.139141***
(0.023193)
0.943622***
(0.046182)
0.248431***
(0.040432)
0.187196**
(0.075458)
-0.46348***
(0.074203)
0.121028*
(0.066738)
-0.30439*
(0.168932)
0.587601***
(0.048869)
0.208112*
(0.118975)
0.657553***
(0.125901)

Observations

0.255845
(0.347710)
312

R2

0.3506

0.10397***
(0.011774)
0.28096***
(0.044373)
-0.32963**
(0.133813)
-0.40140***
(0.085712)
-0.38006***
(0.012169)
-0.16633**
(0.066592)
-0.03657*
(0.017147)
0.11596***
(0.020668)
-0.23448***
(0.025818)
0.18841***
(0.072039)
-0.15624**
(0.071258)
--0.28714**
(0.145733)
0.59132***
(0.113971)
0.08463
(0.106305)
256
0.3377

*** denotes 1% confidence, ** denotes 5% confidence, * denotes 10% confidence
Note: Only results for variables with statistical significance are included in this table
although the regression contained other continuous variables and SIC codes.
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Table VII: Descriptive Statistics, Regression (1)
Variable
OFFERA
SALES
EMP
OVERH
TOP
DAYS
DATE

(1)
0.000103
(8.76E-05)
5.14E-06
(2.92E-05)
2.77E-06
(6.58E-06)
-0.05742
(0.079576)
0.016669
(0.018223)
-1.2E-05
(2.01E-05)
-1.6E-05*
(9.05E-06)

SIC (Continued)
73890000
82990000
SIC*FOREIGN
13820000 1
20850000 1
27410000 1

SIC
20850000
27410000
27590000
28210000
28340000
28360000
28990000
35590000
35770000
36610000
36630000
36740000
38230000
38410000
38450000
38510000
39490000

0.112387
(0.15433)
0.115064
(0.076396)

27590000 1
0.001736
(0.070427)
0.20356**
(0.101931)
0.127807***
(0.062415)
-0.003
(0.077112)
-0.05848
(0.075096)
-0.03645
(0.079903)
-0.15236**
(0.074041)
0.000792
(0.148034)
0.308496***
(0.115796)
0.214353**
(0.103462)
0.269779***
(0.071245)
0.068055
(0.07332)
-0.00794
(0.088529)
0.078765
(0.113568
-0.00872
(0.08474)
0.146217**
(0.073161)
0.333772***
(0.067048)

28210000 1
28340000 1
28360000 1
28990000 1
35590000 1
35770000 1
36610000 1
36630000 1
36740000 1
38230000 1
38410000 1
38450000 1
38510000 1
39490000 1
44120000 1
45120000 1
47240000 1

25

-0.0772
(0.061394)
-0.01101
(0.029602)
-0.16183
(0.100177)
0.095507***
(0.015181)
0.267028***
(0.050187)
-0.03675
(0.047598)
0.012679
(0.041104)
0.142857
(0.090419)
0.143784
(0.235603)
-0.33417***
(0.127171)
-0.40423***
(0.082064)
-0.40262***
(0.022021)
-0.00798
(0.083239)
-0.10844
(0.071492)
0.060355
(0.090922)
-0.00084
(0.161486)
-0.06052**
(0.026025)
0.139141***
(0.023193)
0.022369
(0.036864)
0.05249
(0.129312)
0.943622***
(0.046182)

44120000
45120000
47240000
48120000
48130000
48330000
48990000
49410000
51710000
55410000
55990000
58120000
59120000
ok64110000
65310000
67260000
70110000
73120000
73710000
73720000
73750000

-0.0401
(0.075379)
0.089895
(0.140074)
-0.09322
(0.067825)
-0.04919
(0.074077)
-0.00641
(0.134156)
-0.11018
(0.075745)
-0.02509
(0.097292)
0.451759***
(0.067968)
-0.02279
(0.06757)
0.028797
(0.072913)
-0.00985
(0.101103)
0.138174
(0.126044)
-0.00212
(0.08897)
-0.05731
(0.081969)
-0.00217
(0.199725)
0.015016
(0.078933)
-0.11564
(0.172699)
-0.10087
(0.076719)
0.016401
(0.090693)
0.045364
(0.098739)
0.024912
(0.150573)

48120000 1
48130000 1
48330000 1
48990000 1
49410000 1
51710000 1
55410000 1
55990000 1
58120000 1
59120000 1
64110000 1
65310000 1
67260000 1
70110000 1
73120000 1
73710000 1
73720000 1
73750000 1
73890000 1
82990000 1
89990000 1

(Results continued again at top)

CONSTANT

-0.03957
(0.060167)
-0.0523
(0.118872)
0.248431***
(0.040432)
0.187196**
(0.075458)
-0.46348***
(0.074203)
0.121028*
(0.066738)
-0.30439*
(0.168932)
0.028531
(0.077906)
0.131658
(0.20644)
-0.06072
(0.091203)
0.587601***
(0.048869)
0.101166
(0.226836)
0.126185
(0.177884)
0.208112*
(0.118975)
0.027294
(0.068749)
0.180385
(0.166595)
-0.02667
(0.171288)
0.657553***
(0.125901)
0.029441
(0.258206)
0.043318
(0.154813)
0.41346
(0.757381)
0.255845
(0.347711)

*** denotes 1% confidence, ** denotes 5% confidence, * denotes 10% confidence
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